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Scholars examining the use of historical practice in constitutional
adjudication have focused on a few high-profile separation-of-powers
disputes, such as the recent decisions in NLRB v. Noel Canning and
Zivotofsky v. Kerry. This essay argues that “big cases make bad theory”—
that the focus on high-profile cases of this type distorts our understanding
of how historical practice figures in constitutional adjudication more
generally. I shift focus here to the more prosaic terrain of federal courts
law, in which practice plays a pervasive role. That shift reveals two
important insights: First, while historical practice plays an important
constitutive role, structuring and filling gaps in the judicial architecture,
that practice is, in contrast to the practices in Noel Canning and Zivotofsky,
rarely entrenched against ordinary legal change. Second, the authority of
historical practice in high-profile separation-of-powers disputes generally
rests on a theory of acquiescence by one branch in the other’s actions; the
federal courts cases, in contrast, ignore acquiescence and instead ground
practice’s authority in its longstanding observance.
The use of historical practice in federal courts law rests on a theory
of prescription—that is, past practice derives authority from its sheer pastness. This essay explores the centrality of prescription in Burkean political
theory and suggests that cases relying on past practices can contribute to
the development of a distinctively Burkean theory of constitutional law. This
theory suggests that past practice plays an important constitutive role, but
as in the federal courts cases, that role is not entrenched against ordinary
legal change. The fact that historical practice is not entrenched—and can
be changed through democratic processes—helps to answer several key
criticisms of relying on practice in constitutional adjudication.
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A spate of recent, high-profile separation of powers cases at the Supreme Court has
turned a spotlight on courts’ reliance on historical practice in constitutional cases. In NLRB
v. Noel Canning,1 the Court looked to the practice of past Presidents and Congresses in
resolving three questions about the meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause. Likewise,
in Zivotofsky v. Kerry,2 the Court relied on Executive practice and Congress’s acquiescence
to determine that Congress may not regulate the President’s power to recognize (or not
recognize) the territorial claims of foreign governments. These and other cases have
prompted an outpouring of scholarship concerning the courts’ reliance on historical
practice outside the usual parameters of originalist interpretation—that is, the use of
historical practices that are not evidence of the Founders’ intentions or understandings but
that nonetheless may help resolve disputed questions of constitutional meaning.3
In this article, I suggest that high-profile disputes over the separation of powers can
tell us only part of the story concerning the role of historical practice in constitutional
analysis. I shift focus from separation of powers disputes to the somewhat more prosaic
terrain of federal courts law.4 That field, to be sure, has its share of high-stakes inter-branch
confrontations—for example, over Congress’s authority to restrict the federal courts’
jurisdiction.5 But federal courts doctrine often looks to historical practice in less dramatic
ways. Consider, for example, a typical civil rights suit against a state officer under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. In adjudicating such a case, a court is likely to frame the plaintiff’s
“reasonable expectation of privacy” in terms of common social practices;6 to look to
1

134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (holding that the Recess Appointments Clause permits appointments during both
inter- and intra-session recesses and covers vacancies that arise prior to the recess, but does not permit
appointments when the Senate is in pro forma session).
135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015) (holding that Congress may not require the Secretary of State to designate “Israel”
as the place of birth on a passport issued to a citizen born in Jerusalem, in contravention of Executive policy).
2

3

See, e.g. Shalev Roisman, Constitutional Acquiescence, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2016);
Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional
Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2015); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss
and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012).
By “federal courts” law, I mean the body of law governing the jurisdiction and remedial powers of the
federal judiciary, as well as that judiciary’s interaction with state law and state courts. See generally Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 961-63 (1994)
(discussing the somewhat fuzzy boundaries of the federal courts field). I also construe the term broadly to
include recurrent institutional problems arising in federal litigation, such as the courts’ stance toward statutes
and their own precedents. These are not exclusively problems of federal courts law, but they are muchdiscussed in that field.
4

5

See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (striking down restrictions on judicial review of
determinations that Guantanamo Bay detainees were enemy combatants under the Suspension Clause); Ex
parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869) (upholding restriction on Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to
review challenge to military reconstruction of the South).
6

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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common law practice in assessing both the measure of damages7 and the defendant’s
official immunity;8 and to assess the availability of an injunction against future intrusions
in light of the traditions of equity.9
Because it focuses on high-profile separation of powers disputes, the existing
literature on historical practice in constitutional adjudication tends to ignore the sort of case
just described. But practice is in fact pervasive in federal courts law. That body of law
borrows from the common law and equity practice in shaping judicial procedure and
remedies;10 it employs canons of statutory construction designed, at bottom, to harmonize
new law with longstanding practice;11 and it structures the intricate relationship between
the federal and state judicial systems by constant reference to longstanding usage.12 These
sorts of reliance on past practice differ in important ways from use of practice in cases like
Noel Canning or Zivotofsky. Practice in federal courts law often bears a different
relationship to the constitutional text, for example, and it rests on a different justificatory
rationale. I submit that we miss a lot about historical practice by focusing only on the highprofile cases. One might thus sum up the line taken here as “Big cases make bad theory”—
or at least incomplete theory.
Shifting the focus to federal courts law and the judicial power entails a second
analytical move as well. This essay considers a variety of ways in which historical practices
influence judicial decision—including judges’ reliance on past precedents, their
incorporation of preexisting common law or equitable doctrines to fill numerous gaps in
our procedural and remedial regime, and the employment of canons of statutory
construction—that are subconstitutional in nature. One might say that these practices are
all “constitutional” in that they involve constructions of the “judicial power” recognized in
Article III.13 But while that is true, it also seems a bit too easy. It is more straightforward

7

See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-58 (1978).

8

See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984).

9

See Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486 (1903).

10

See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (grounding state sovereign immunity in the English
common law); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (recognizing private remedies against state officials,
notwithstanding sovereign immunity, based in part on traditions of equitable relief against government
officials in English practice).
11

See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921
(1992).
12

See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S 37 (1971) (relying on longstanding equitable principles to forbid
federal judicial interference with ongoing state criminal proceedings); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S.
(20 Wall.) 590 (1874) (rejecting arguments that an amendment to the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional statute
was intended to fundamentally alter the relationship between that court and the state courts).
13

See, e.g., Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 900-04 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054
(8th Cir. 2000) (suggesting that stare decisis is part of the meaning of the “judicial power”).
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to say that these practices each perform a constitutional function—they help constitute the
judicial power that Article III incompletely specifies—and thus form part of our
“constitution outside the Constitution.”14 This notion, that the canonical text of the
Constitution includes only a subset of the principles that constitute our government, goes
back at least as far as Karl Llewellyn’s idea of a “working constitution” in 1934.15 I build
on that notion here to suggest that any effort to assess the courts’ reliance on historical
practice in public law should include not only its use to resolve controversies about the
constitutional text but also the broader set of practices that constitute much of our working
system of governance. Federal courts law provides particularly fertile ground for that
broader assessment.
My exploration of the courts’ reliance on historical practice in the context of
disputes about the judicial power yields two primary conclusions. The first is that using
such practices to interpret the meaning of particular constitutional terms—which I will call
historical “gloss”—is probably not the most common or the most important role that
historical practice plays. When courts use practice to “gloss” a constitutional term, they
tend to entrench that practice against change through ordinary legal means. Hence, in
Zivotofsky, the majority read past practice by the President either recognizing or refusing
to recognize territorial claims of foreign governments as a gloss on the meaning of
Executive power, such that Congress could not regulate that practice by statute.16
Constitutionalizing past practices dramatically raises the stakes of that kind of
interpretation and may create all sorts of perverse incentives.
Much use of practice in federal courts law, however, supplements the text by filling
in the many gaps in Article III’s plan for the judicial system. Critically, historical practice
that supplements the constitutional text need not be—and generally is not—itself
constitutionally entrenched. The jurisprudential literature on constitutional functions
distinguishes between the constitutive function (establishing, empowering, and limiting
governmental institutions) and the entrenchment function (immunizing those institutions
from change through ordinary legal processes).17 Much—but not all—of the historical
usage pervading federal courts law performs a constitutive function but remains subject to
change through ordinary legislation. Current law’s borrowing of common law principles
14

Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L. J. 408 (2007).

15

Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934). The notion that a
constitution functionally includes all the legal materials that define, facilitate, and constrain a government’s
exercise of its powers is commonplace in British law, which has long defined the “Constitution” as simply
the sum of these materials. See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 22 (8th ed. 1915).
16

Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2095 (2015).

17

See, e.g., Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 152 (Larry Alexander, ed., 1998); Young, Outside the
Constitution, supra note 14, at 415-28.
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of official immunity,18 for example, can be changed through statutory enactment.
Incorporation of historical practice tends to be most controversial where this is not the
case—where, for example, common law immunities are given entrenched constitutional
status.19
My second point is that reliance on historical practice in federal courts law
frequently rests on a different justificatory basis than the rationales featured in cases like
Noel Canning and Zivotofsky. Those cases—and much of the academic literature that has
grown up around them—speak primarily of rival institutions’ acquiescence in a particular
branch’s exercise of power.20 Much of the reliance on historical usage that I explore here,
however, occurs in context where acquiescence seems largely beside the point. Instead, the
turn to practice rests on more amorphous notions that past usage has its own legitimacy, if
not authority, based on its very past-ness. Much reliance on historical practice in this area,
I suggest, invokes a form of prescription.
Edmund Burke famously said that “[p]rescription is the most solid of all titles, not
only to property, but . . . to government. . . . It is a presumption in favour of any settled
scheme of government against any untried project, that a nation has long existed and
flourished under it.”21 Burke went so far as to insist that the authority of traditional practice
“is a far better presumption even of the choice of a nation, far better than any sudden and
temporary arrangement by actual election.”22 Customary practice and prescriptive wisdom
have long played an important role in American constitutionalism, but they remain
underappreciated in constitutional theory. Reliance on tradition has been criticized from
multiple directions as either too easy to manipulate23 (and therefore a cover for judicial
activism) or too confining24 (and therefore likely to lock in an unjust status quo). And from
a more positivist standpoint, reliance on historical practice in constitutional interpretation

18

See, e.g., Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982).

19

See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 165-68 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for conferring constitutional status on state sovereign immunity that forecloses
alteration by statute).
20

See, e.g, Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2091; NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2571-72 (2014); see also
Roisman, supra note 3; Bradley & Siegel, supra note 3, at 44 (“Under most accounts of historical gloss, there
must be some acquiescence in the practice by the other political branch of government in order for the practice
to be credited.”).
21

Edmund Burke, Speech on the Reform of Representation in the House of Commons (1787), in 2 THE WORKS
at 486, 487 (Henry G. Bohn ed., 1841).

OF THE RIGHT HON. EDMUND BURKE,
22

Id.

23

See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613,
1615 (1990).
24

See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1699, 1708
(1991).
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arguably permits changes in constitutional meaning that circumvent both Article V’s
amendment process and more general limits on judicial lawmaking.25
Distinguishing between the constitutive and entrenchment aspects of
constitutionalism helps to address these criticisms. Much past practice in the federal courts
field derives its authority from longstanding usage, largely independent of legitimation
through some form of acquiescence. But because little of that practice is entrenched against
legal change, it simply does not raise the same concerns about “constitutional adverse
possession” that arise when historical practice is used to “gloss” the meaning of
constitutional text. The weight of the “dead hand of the past”26 is less oppressive when past
practices are subject to legislative override.
Conversely, the incremental and evolutionary reform that prescription also entails
is easier to defend when it does not involve change in the meaning of entrenched
constitutional principles and structures. I do not deny that courts make law when, for
example, they import common law or equitable principles to define the scope of federal
jurisdiction or recognize and limit remedies against government actors. This sort of judicial
lawmaking—the subject of an extensive literature on federal common law—raises
legitimacy problems of its own.27 But the Courts do not circumvent Article V so long as
they do not seek to confer any sort of entrenched status on these norms. And the more
general critique of judicial lawmaking is surely less compelling when such lawmaking
conforms to roles that our courts have exercised since the beginning of the Republic. There
is a certain circularity, of course, in saying that tradition legitimizes the courts’ reliance on
tradition. But prescriptive authority necessarily embraces that sort of circularity.28
By surveying the uses of historical practice, I hope to make three broader
contribution to the literature in constitutional theory. As Richard Fallon has noted, all
participants in debates about constitutional interpretation seem agree that history is relevant
to that enterprise; it turns out, however, that history is used in multifarious ways and not

25

See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2617 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that by
relying on ambiguous historical practice rather than the constitutional text, “[t]he majority replaces the
Constitution's text with a new set of judge-made rules to govern recess appointments”).
26

See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1127 (1998) (discussing the “dead hand problem” in constitutional law).
27

See generally Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1639
(2008); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1986);
Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7–12 (1985).
28

See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional Adjudication, 90 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1753, 1808 (2015) (observing that “any practice-based theory of law contains an irreducible
element of circularity: what is accepted as law determines what the law is, either directly in cases of consensus
or partly when otherwise disputable questions must be resolved based on a mix of fit with past practice and
normative attractiveness”).
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simply to establish the original understanding of constitutional text.29 The first
contribution, then, is simply to expand our understanding of how past practices figure in
debates about constitutional law.
The second contribution bears on the literature of constitutional change. That
literature is driven by a single compelling observation—that is, that the structure of
contemporary American governance and the array of rights that individuals possess are
hare to square with the original understanding of the Constitution’s text, including the
textual amendments.30 The most prominent theories of constitutional change outside
Article V—such as Bruce Ackerman’s theory of “constitutional moments”31—have
dazzled more than they have persuaded.32 If some form of “living constitutionalism” is a
fact of modern life, we need a much more specific (and plausible) account of its
mechanisms and some notion how those mechanisms are disciplined and constrained. I
submit that historical practice plays a leading role in this story.
Finally, this essay draws on a philosophical tradition that is often neglected in
constitutional debates. Those debates are dominated, on the Right, by a majoritarian and
ultimately rationalistic vision that employs originalism as a constraint on the countermajoritarian power of judges.33 The Left, on the other hand, embraces a vision of living
constitutionalism as a means of either furthering progressive moral values34 or carving out
a wider sphere for technocratic pragmatism.35 This essay builds instead on an older
tradition of classical conservative thought built around a Burkean commitment to
prescriptive knowledge and organic, incremental change. Part of my objective here is to
elaborate what a Burkean constitutional theory might look like.36

29

See id. at 1754-55.

30

See Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 14, at 455.

31

BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of
the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994); Akhil Reed
Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988).
32

See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995) (unpersuaded).
33

See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849 (1989); Robert H. Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. J. 1 (1971).
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); GOODWIN LIU, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & CHRISTOPHER
H. SCHROEDER, KEEPING FAITH WITH THE CONSTITUTION (2010); Rebecca L. Brown, Assisted Living for the
Constitution, 59 Drake L. Rev. 985, 999 (2011); Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV.7 (1969).
34

35

See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2006);
CASS R, SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1993).
36

A limited constitutional literature on Burke has developed in recent years, but it has been written primarily
by scholars who self-identify as progressives. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH.
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Part I of this essay lays some theoretical groundwork. I try to be more specific about
what we mean by reliance on historical practice, discuss the distinct constitutive and
entrenchment functions of constitutions, and introduce Burke’s theory of prescription. Part
II assesses several specific areas in which federal courts law relies upon historical practice:
the doctrine of precedent; incorporation into federal doctrine of preexisting bodies of law,
such as the English common law or equity practice; and the canons of statutory
construction. None of these areas invokes practice as a historical “gloss” on the
Constitution’s text in the manner of Noel Canning and similar separation of powers cases,
and each tends to derive the legitimacy of practice from long duration rather than from
notions of inter-branch acquiescence.
Part III draws some general conclusions. I argue that using historical practice as a
gloss on constitutional text to resolve contested questions of separation of powers is neither
the most common nor the most important way in which such practice contributes to our
law. Entrenching such practice against legal change, I argue, tends to be counterproductive.
Moreover, reliance on practice is best justified on prescriptive grounds. The primary
alternative—practice as acquiescence—is both descriptively implausible and normatively
unappealing. In the end, I hope to show that attendance to the uses of practice in the
somewhat more prosaic setting of federal jurisdiction can both allay certain fears about
reliance on practice and contribute to important current debates about constitutional
interpretation.
I.

Historical Practice and Constitutional Functions

The appropriate role of history has long been a staple of debates about constitutional
meaning. Attention has focused, however, on the use of historical materials to ascertain the
intent of the constitutional Framers and the original understanding of terms appearing in
the constitutional text.37 Philip Bobbitt’s well-known modalities of constitutional
argument, for example, defined the “historical” modality as focused on “the intentions of
the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution”; none of his six modalities afforded a place to
past practices that did not go to original intent.38 But as Richard Fallon recently observed,
“increasingly tired, stylized debates” about originalism in constitutional interpretation
obscure the wide variety of ways in which history may influence the determination of

L. REV. 353 (2006). That literature is useful and interesting, but for obvious reasons its embrace of Burke is
partial and limited.
37

Compare, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three
Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226 (1988) (defending focus on the Framers’ intent), with Paul
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. Rev. 204 (1980) (just like it
sounds).
38

PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12-13 (1991).
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constitutional meaning.39 Post-founding practice, for example, may provide insights into
the original understanding of constitutional terms, resolve disputes about that meaning that
existed at the Founding, or suggest organic growth of constitutional meaning over time.40
Historical practice has particular significance in federal courts law. The
constitutional text says little about the judicial power, and both the convention and
ratification debates focused largely on other topics.41 As a result, the structure of the federal
judicial system, its modes of proceeding, and its relation both to the other national branches
of government and to the state governments have been fleshed out through a wide variety
of subconstitutional practices. These include a succession of judiciary statutes enacted by
Congress, rules of procedure promulgated by the courts in the exercise of delegated
authority, a robust array of common law and equitable doctrines, and a plethora of less
formal norms and ways of proceeding that have grown up over time. These enactments and
practices have legal force in their own right, but they also inform our understanding of “the
judicial power” in Article III.
Notwithstanding the pervasive impact of historical practice on the law of federal
jurisdiction, the phenomenon remains understudied in this field. Much of the recent
literature on historical practice as a modality of constitutional interpretation focuses on
separation of powers.42 With certain important exceptions,43 historical writing about
federal jurisdiction has been in the originalist vein.44 This may be more the case today than
in the golden age of Legal Process scholarship that once dominated and defined the field
of federal jurisdiction. That scholarship was often functionalist in its orientation, and when
it turned to history it frequently looked to practice across the broad sweep of our national

39

Fallon, History, supra note 28, at 1753.

On history’s relation to the organic growth of constitutional meaning, see, e.g., Ernest A. Young,
Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. Rev.
619, 688-712 (1994).
40

41

See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1 (7th ed. 2015) [hereinafter HART
& WECHSLER].
42

See, e.g., sources cited in note 3, supra.

A recent panel of the Association of American Law Schools Section on Federal Courts addressed “The
Role of History in the Federal Courts Canon.” See Amanda L. Tyler, Assessing the Role of History in the
Federal Courts Canon: A Word of Caution, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1739 (2015); Fallon, History, supra
note 28; Tara Leigh Grove, Article III in the Political Branches, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1835 (2015).
43

See, e.g., Tyler, History, supra note 43, at 1739 (observing that “in the federal courts arena—more so than
in the broader domain of constitutional law—originalism has always wielded tremendous influence over
much of the judicial and scholarly thinking”).
44
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experience, not simply to the Founding era.45 Nonetheless, the broader current of
contemporary constitutional theory may have something to add to the way that federal
courts scholarship has thought about historical practice. And the Federal Courts literature
may have something useful to say to the broader current of constitutional theory.
A.

What Do We Mean by “Practice,” and How Do Courts Rely on It?

It will help to begin by defining somewhat more precisely what we mean by
historical practice. “Practice” is, of course, a very broad term; the Oxford English
Dictionary defines it, for instance, as simply “[a]n action” or “a deed” and contrasts it with
“theory.”46 This definition is broad enough to include virtually any binding legal materials,
such as a statute or a constitutional provision. To speak of historical practice as a distinct
source of legal meaning, however, we need to distinguish it from past governmental actions
that bind courts and other decisionmakers of their own force. For purposes of this
discussion, I take a “practice” to be any past action of a public or private actor that is
invoked to resolve a present legal dispute even though it has no direct binding effect on
that dispute.
Common definitions of “practice” often incorporate the additional element of
repetition and regularity; the OED speaks of “[t]he habitual doing or carrying on of
something,” “usual, customary, or constant action or performance,” or “[a] habitual action
or pattern of behavior.”47 Hence, Justice Frankfurter emphasized the authority of a
“systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued”48; likewise, Noel Canning and
Zivotofsky looked to past congressional and executive actions for a pattern of behavior, not
simply a single authoritative instance.49 I have little doubt that the influence of a practice
will be at least partly a function of the degree and consistency of its repetition. At this
definitional stage, however, I do not want to rule out the possibility that a single act might
not have authoritative influence in certain situations.50
45

See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489
(1954); Herbert L. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the Federal Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 578 (1954).
46

OXFORD
ENGLISH
DICTIONARY
(3d
ed.
2006),
available
at
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/149226?rskey=ksMl1h&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid (definition 2b);
see also id. (definition 2a: “The actual application or use of an idea, belief, or method, as opposed to the
theory or principles of it . . . .”).
Id. (definitions 3a & 3b); see also id. (definition 3c: “Law. An established legal procedure, esp. that of a
court of law; the law and custom on which such procedure is based.”).
47

48

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

49

See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091-94 (2015); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550,
2561-64 (2014).
For example, George Washington’s decision not to run for a third term is a classic example of an historical
practice that shaped public understandings of the Presidency. See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Understanding
Informal Constitutional Change, Tulane University School of Law Public Law and Legal Theory Working
50
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What practice counts, temporally speaking? As one “present at the creation” of our
government, at a time when American government had no truly “longstanding” practice of
its own, James Madison understandably emphasized the force of precedents set by early
politicians and courts in elucidating constitutional meaning.51 But whether or not that very
early practice has unique or even exclusive force in other areas of constitutional law,52 the
law of federal courts has frequently relied on both historical practice that long predates the
Constitution (e.g., the traditions of English practice at common law and in equity and
admiralty53) and that developed considerably after ratification (e.g., conventions about the
role of the U.S. Supreme Court vis-à-vis state courts54). In these scenarios, the force of
practice comes not so much from the status of politicians and judges closely associated
with the Founding itself, but rather from the weight of longstanding usage over time.
Courts have relied on practice and usage in a variety of ways. Justice Frankfurter
wrote in Youngstown that “[d]eeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government
cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the words of a text
or supply them.”55 This statement, occurring just before Frankfurter’s oft-quoted mention
of “gloss,”56 neatly articulates the two ways in which historical practice generally enters
into constitutional analysis: practice helps us interpret the meaning of provisions in the
constitutional text; and practice also supplements that canonical text, filling in its many
gaps and thus becoming part of our “constitution outside the Constitution.”

Paper No. 16-1, at 13 (Jan. 2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2724580 (discussing the significance
of this example). That decision derived considerable force from subsequent presidents’ repeated to conform
their practice to Washington (at least until FDR). But much of its force surely derived from the prestige and
personal authority of Washington himself. See, e.g., RICHARD BROOKHISER, FOUNDING FATHER:
REDISCOVERING GEORGE WASHINGTON 185-90 (1996) (discussing the power of Washington’s example).
51

See The Federalist No. 37, at 241, 245 (Isaac Kramnick, ed., 1987) (1788); see also, e.g., STANLEY ELKINS
& ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788-1800, at 55-56
(1993) (discussing how very early interactions between President Washington and the Senate demonstrated
the unworkability of the Senate “advising” the President before he took action on a matter, establishing a
precedent emphasizing ex post “consent”).
52

See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 3, at 29-41 (canvassing and rejecting arguments for exclusive reliance
on early practice in the broader separation of powers context); see also William Baude, Liquidation and
Federal Judicial Power, unpublished manuscript (Oct. 2015) (arguing that Madison gave primacy to later
practice).
53

See Section II.B, infra.

54

See, e.g., Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874) (construing amendments to the Supreme
Court’s jurisdictional statute not to disrupt the longstanding relationship between the Court and the state
courts).
55

Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

See id. (“It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to confine it to the words
of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them.”).
56
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Much discussion of relying on historical practice in constitutional law has focused
on the first category. Acknowledging that the Founding had failed to resolve all ambiguities
in the constitutional document, James Madison said in Federalist 37 that indeterminacy is
inevitable in “the institutions of man, in which the obscurity arises as well from the object
itself as from the organ by which it is contemplated.”57 Hence, “[a]ll new laws, though
penned with the greatest technical skill and passed on the fullest and most mature
deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be
liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.”58 And
as Madison’s subsequent conduct and statements made clear, he thought those subsequent
“discussions and adjudications” might well occur outside the courts as well as within
them.59 In this vein, the Noel Canning majority turned to historical interactions between
the President and Congress to establish the meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause.60
On the other hand, much reliance on past practice in the law of federal courts, which
I discuss in Part II, seems supplemental in nature. Article III does not specify the scope of
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction; in Murdock v. Memphis,61 however, the Court
imposed a strong presumption, derived from longstanding practice, that the Court may not
review state courts’ resolution of questions of state law. Likewise, the Court has made clear
that its broad conception of state sovereign immunity is not a “gloss” on either Article III
or the Eleventh Amendment, but rather an artifact of preexisting practice under the English
common law.62
Not surprisingly, however, the line between these two modes is not completely
clean even in theory, much less in practice. One might describe phenomena such as the
doctrine of precedent or adoption of preexisting bodies of law as a gloss on the meaning of
the “judicial power” language in Article III without making any mistake of principle. The
key consideration, to my mind, lies in the amount of work that the relevant textual provision
57

The Federalist No. 37, at 241, 244 (Isaac Kramnick, ed., 1987) (1788) (James Madison); see also id. at 245
(“When the Almighty himself condescends to address mankind in their own language, his meaning, luminous
as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated.”).
58

Id. at 245.

59

See, e.g., 1 Annals of Cong. 514 (1789) (Madison arguing to his colleagues in the First Congress that their
practice regarding presidential removal of executive branch officers “will become the permanent exposition
of the Constitution” on that point); see also Bradley & Siegel, supra note 3, at 34 (emphasizing that “Madison
referred both to practice and to judicial decisions as involved in liquidation”).
60

See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2561-64, 2570-73 (2014).

61

87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).

62

See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69
(1996); see also Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) (“Manifestly, we cannot
rest with a mere literal application of the words of § 2 of Article III, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh
Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-consenting States. Behind the words of the
constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control.”).
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does in the analysis. In Noel Canning, for example, the text of the Recess Appointments
Clause sharply defined and limited the relevant set of practices, and those practices in turn
plainly reflected an effort by the respective political actors to interpret the Clause. 63 Hence,
I would treat Noel Canning as a clear case of historical gloss.64
At the other end of the spectrum, consider the federal courts importing the
longstanding equitable prohibition on enjoining a criminal prosecution to ground the
doctrine of Younger abstention.65 One might say that Younger is a gloss on the “judicial
power” as it relates to the powers of federal judges vis-à-vis state courts, but the text of
Article III does precious little work in the analysis of historical practice. It seems much
more helpful to say simply that Article III leaves the relations of state and federal courts
unspecified in a variety of important ways, and that Younger abstention supplements the
canonical text by helping to constitute that relationship.
The Zivotofsky case poses an intermediate—and therefore more difficult—case.
The only constitutional text in sight is Article II, which empowers the President to “receive
ambassadors and other public ministers.”66 The Court read Founding-era practice as a gloss
on that language, concluding “that a Clause directing the President alone to receive
ambassadors would be understood to acknowledge his power to recognize other nations.”67
The Court relied on further evidence of practice—this time in international law—to
conclude that this recognition power “may also involve the determination of a state’s
territorial bounds.”68 Finally, the Court canvassed extensive evidence of practices by
presidents and the Congress concerning whether the recognition power is exclusive to the
Executive.69 Whether or not the Court correctly evaluated all this evidence of practice
concerning recognition, it seems a considerable stretch to say that Article II’s text—which
does not use the term and covers only receiving ambassadors—is doing much work. Better,

63

See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2567-68 (2014).

64

Some commentators have seen an important difference between the use of practices stretching over the
course of our history to interpret ambiguous constitutional text (“gloss”) and a focus on immediate postratification practice to fix the meaning of ambiguous terms (“liquidation”). The important point for my
purposes, however, is simply that both liquidation and gloss employ practice as an interpretive tool for
discerning the meaning of ambiguous constitutional text.
65

See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971) (relying on English equity practice for rule barring
federal court interference with pending state court criminal proceedings).
66

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.

67

135 S. Ct. at 2085.

68

Id. at 2084 (citing an international law treatise).

69

See id. at 2091-94.
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I think, to say that the Court is filling in the gaps in the President’s power—that is,
supplementing the canonical text—by looking to past usage.70
A final critical issue involves the status of practice-based norms vis-à-vis legal
efforts to alter or override them. In Zivotofsky, the Court held that Congress could not
override the Executive’s decision concerning territorial recognition;71 hence, the Court not
only gave legal force to the past practice of Executive recognition but also entrenched that
practice against change through ordinary lawmaking. I explore the importance of this move
in the next section.
B.

The Constitutive and Entrenchment Functions of Constitutions

This essay is about the use of historical practice in constitutional cases, but I am
employing a broader-than-usual view of what falls in that category. Contemporary
constitutional theory seeks to unpack the various functions of constitutions.72 As I have
developed elsewhere, constitutions typically do at least three things: they constitute the
government by creating institutions, defining those institutions’ powers and conferring
jurisdiction upon them, and articulating rules for their operation; they frequently confer
rights on individuals vis-à-vis the government (which is really just the flip-side of the
constitutive function); and many (but certainly not all) constitutions entrench the
institutions and rights they create against easy change in the future. 73 Our Constitution,
unlike the British, seeks to encapsulate each of these functions in a single, canonical
document. Writing in Federalist 37, however, James Madison candidly acknowledged the
complexity of defining the powers and limits of governmental institutions as well the
difficulty of reducing the requisite concepts to writing.74

70

See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 14-15 (2d ed. 1996)
(identifying executive foreign affairs powers that are “missing” from the constitutional text but that have
been filled in by practice).
71

135 S. Ct. at 2094-95.

72

See, e.g., ADAM TOMKINS, PUBLIC LAW 3-6 (2003); Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of
Constitutions: Some Preliminaries, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 152, 153-54
(Larry Alexander, ed., 1998); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 227 (identifying “constitutional
essentials”).
73

See Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 14, at 415-16; Raz, supra note 72, at 153-54. The British
Constitution, for example, is generally not entrenched because the King in Parliament retains authority to
make or unmake any law. See TOMKINS, supra note 72, at 16-17.
74

See Federalist No. 37, supra note 51, at 243-45; see also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920)
(Holmes, J.) (“[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the
United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the development of which could not
have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters.”).
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Hence, as John Marshall wrote in McCulloch, the Constitution’s nature “requires
that only its great outlines should be marked [and] its important objects designated.”75 This
necessary incompleteness means that the Constitution can have no monopoly of the first of
its functions; it cannot, in other words, constitute a complete government on its own.
Hence, Article I describes Congress in greater detail than the other two branches, yet it
leaves out critical details such as structures for deliberation, voting rules, or qualifications
to vote in congressional elections.76 These details have all been filled in through
subconstitutional practices—some statutory, some internal House and Senate rules, and
some unwritten conventions of behavior.77 Article III, which describes the judiciary in far
less detail, punted most of the crucial questions—such as whether to create lower federal
courts at all—to the First Congress and continues to require considerable gap-filling.78
I have called the various forms of “ordinary law”—statutes, regulations,
conventional practices—that perform these constitutive functions our “Constitution
Outside the Constitution.”79 But that does not mean that these rules and institutions share
the entrenched status of the Constitution’s canonical text. To be sure, some of the historical
practices that have fleshed out the meaning of the Article III judicial power have hardened
into rules that Congress may not override. It seems safe to say, for example, that Congress
could not now enact a statute empowering the Supreme Court to issue advisory opinions.80
My point is simply that whether a given practice should be viewed as constitutive of our
governmental institutions is a separate question from whether that practice is also
entrenched against change through ordinary legal means.81 In general, I would venture that

75

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).

76

See Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 14, at 418-20.

See generally Llewellyn, supra note 15 (discussing the nation’s “working constitution”). As Stephen
Griffin has pointed out, Professor Llewellyn took practice to have more than a gap-filling role; the practice
is the Constitution, even where it may be inconsistent with textual rules. See Griffin, supra note 50, at 12.
77

78

See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 41, at 4-47; JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS,
AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 24-31 (2012).
79

See Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 14, at 473.

See Fallon, History, supra note 28, at 1817 (“At an early point in our history, The Correspondence of the
Justices and the acceptance of its rationale by the Supreme Court, presidents, and the American public placed
advisory opinions in the category of the constitutionally forbidden.”).
80

See Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 14, at 454-55. Other theories of a “functional” or “small
c” constitution typically do assert that these additional rules and institutions are entrenched to some degree.
See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN
COSNTITUTION (2013); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6 (1991); Llewellyn, supra note
15, at 26, 29; This creates a lot of pressure to define what is in and what is out—a burden that, in my view,
these other theories have largely failed to carry. See Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 14, at 44854.
81
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most governmental practices are constitutive to at least some degree, but very few are
constitutionally entrenched.
One of the principal sources of discomfort about the use of historical practice in
constitutional law stems from the fear that past practices will either alter entrenched
constitutional norms or come to be entrenched against change in their own right. Dissenting
in the recent Noel Canning decision, for example, Justice Scalia worried that relying on
historical practice allows the Executive to “accumulate power through adverse
possession,” in violation of entrenched constitutional norms.82 But to say that American
law sometimes “constitutionalizes” historical practice is all too often to conflate the
different things that constitutions do. Many instances of reliance on historical practice—
especially in the law of federal jurisdiction—treat that practice as constitutive without
entrenching it against legal change;83 other instances entrench past practice only partially,
without putting them on the same plane as the Constitution itself.84 Distinguishing between
the different roles practice plays will help in assessing the normative attractiveness of
appeals to practice in this area.
C.

Acquiescence and Prescription

Edmund Burke referred to reliance on longstanding practice in government as
“prescription”—a word we do not use so much nowadays but which helpfully adds the
notion of legal force to more general terms like “custom” or “historical practice.” 85
Prescription embodies “a choice not of one day, or one set of people” but rather “a
deliberate election of ages and generations”; “it is a constitution made by . . . the peculiar
circumstances, occasions, tempers, dispositions, and moral, civil and social habitudes of
the people, which disclose themselves only in a long space of time.”86 Against
Enlightenment rationalists who set out to question “unthinking” adherence to tradition,
Burke insisted that prescription involved a higher form of rationality. “[M]an is a most
unwise, and a most wise, being,” he argued.87 “The individual is foolish. The multitude,
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NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2617 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 732 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that
the abstention doctrines, which are grounded in equity practice, are subject to Congress’s legislative power).
See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (holding Congress’s power to restrict federal court
jurisdiction subject to a strong clear statement rule, but not constitutionally prohibited altogether).
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See,
e.g.,
Oxford
English
Dictionary,
prescription,
at
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/150650?rskey=Sqa4CN&result=1#eid
(3d
ed.
2007)
(defining
“prescription” as “ancient or continued custom, esp. when regarded as authoritative” and a “[c]laim founded
upon long use”).
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Burke, Representation, supra note 21, at 387.
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Id.
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for the moment, is foolish, when they act without deliberation; but the species is wise, and
when time is given to it, as a species, it almost always acts right.”88
As J.G.A. Pocock has demonstrated, Burke’s theory of prescription was rooted in
the classic English doctrine of the ancient constitution that undergirded the development
of the English common law.89 William Blackstone’s Commentaries begin their discussion
of the common law with an account of longstanding custom.90 For Anthony Kronman, this
sort of reasoning from prescriptive authority makes law inherently different from
philosophy: “[T]he past is, for lawyers and judges, a repository of not just of information
but of value, with the power to confer legitimacy on actions in the present, and though its
power to do so is not limitless, neither is it nonexistent. In philosophy, by contrast, the past
has no legitimating power of this sort.”91 In a profound meditation on Burke, Professor
Kronman argues that the past’s authority is distinct from any utilitarian or fairness-based
argument for precedent—that it is, at bottom, essential to what “makes us who we are” as
human beings.92 These sorts of arguments seem to get short shrift in contemporary
discourse.93 One suspects that non-specialists rarely study Burke nowadays.
But in any event one need not go this far to accept the force of prescriptive
reasoning. More practical rationales, resting on the need to treat some things as settled in
order to address present problems in a manageable way, accord authority to past practice
simply because it its longstanding and settled.94 Likewise, concerns about the disruptive
effect of radical change tend to support an incremental approach to constitutional
development that takes much of past practice as given at any particular stage.95
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Id.
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J.G.A. Pocock, Burke and the Ancient Constitution—a Problem in the History of Ideas, in POLITICS,
LANGUAGE AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 202, 227 (1971).
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1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *67-68 (1765); see also id. at *64 (observing
that the ‘unwritten’ laws of England “receive their binding power, and the force of laws, by long and
immemorial usage, and by their universal reception throughout the kingdom”).
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Anthony Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L. J. 1029, 1032-33 (1990).
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See id. at 1065-66. For a different argument that the past has authority simply because it is the past, see
Raz, supra note 72, at 173 (arguing that “[c]onstitutions, at least old ones, do not derive their authority from
the authority of their authors,” but rather “are valid just because they are there, enshrined in the practices of
their countries”).
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See, e.g., Roisman, supra note 3, at 33 (stating, with little elaboration, that past practice cannot have
authoritative force without some further normative reason behind it).
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See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT 7
(2004); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 599 (1987).
95

See MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 411-12 (expanded ed. 1991);
Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 40, at 654-56 (discussing Burke’s preference for
incremental change).
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Burke’s notion that practice derives its authority from longstanding usage—that the
past has authority simply because it is the past—runs counter to much contemporary
discussion of historical practice as an aid to constitutional interpretation. That literature
tends to ground the force of practice in the acquiescence of critical actors.96 Likewise,
Supreme Court opinions resolving high-profile separation of powers disputes among the
branches of the national government tend to emphasize one branch’s acquiescence (or lack
thereof) to the exercise of power by a rival branch.97 To be sure, one may understand any
longstanding usage as resting on a form of acquiescence; if the relevant political or legal
actors had not accepted the practice over time, they would have changed it. Blackstone, for
example, required that a custom “must have been peaceable, and acquiesced in; not subject
to contention and dispute”; this was because “customs owe their origins to common
consent.” 98 But the sort of acquiescence entailed by prescriptive authority tends to take
place over a more extended period of time, and to involve a more diffuse set of actors, than
that involved in high-profile separation of powers disputes. Moreover, the authority of
longstanding practice tends not to depend on any sort of explicit airing of the relevant issue,
to which the affected party might have been expected to object.
Interesting debates exist about the relationship between custom and the common
law, about Blackstone’s particular theories of general and local custom, and the extent to
which those theories were found persuasive in America.99 But the basic point is simply that
longstanding usage was integral to the English common law,100 and this notion of
prescriptive authority would have been part of the Founders’ basic intellectual equipment.
Some influential figures in the early Republic, such as Thomas Jefferson, labored mightily
to reject English traditionalism, and that way of thinking scored important victories in
See, e.g., Bradley & Siegel, supra note 3, at 44 (“Under most accounts of historical gloss, there must be
some acquiescence in the practice by the other political branch of government in order for the practice to be
credited.”); Bradley & Morrison, supra note 3, at 414 (“The most common reason [for giving authority to
historical practice] appears to be the idea that the cited practice involves the ‘acquiescence’ of one branch in
the actions of the other.”); see also Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers
Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109, 134 (1984) (arguing that for a historical practice to have force in construing
the separation of powers, the other branch must have been on notice of the practice and “must have
acquiesced” in it).
96

97

See, e.g, Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091 (2015); NLRB v. Noel Canning,
134 S. Ct. 2550, 2571-72 (2014); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 684 (1981); see also Youngstown,
343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasizing the force of presidential practice “long pursued
to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned”).
98

1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 90, at *77 (emphasis in original). There are, however, important differences
between the sort of acquiescence involved in many separation of powers disputes and “consent” as that term
is generally understood. Bradley & Siegel, supra note 3, at 44 n.240 (“To the extent that historical gloss is
premised only on the acquiescence of the affected branch, it is not thought to require an actual agreement or
bargain between the branches.”).
99

See, e.g., DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 27-41 (2010).

100

See, e.g., J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 30-31 (1967).
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preventing any blanket reception of the common law into the federal Constitution and
rejecting federal prosecutions for federal common law crimes.101 Nonetheless, the newlyindependent States’ universal reception of the English common law102 and the Framers’
direct incorporation of innumerable common law concepts into the Constitution itself103
suggests that the undeniable innovation of a written, higher-law Constitution was grafted
onto a broader legal system that derived significant authority from ancient usage.104 As my
colleague Stephen Sachs has observed, “[n]ot even the American Revolution severed our
links to the legal past: the change in government wasn’t thought to produce a wholesale
change in law, especially private law.”105
Moreover, because the new written constitution provided only a framework of
government and was designed to be accessible to the People at large, it necessarily lacked
the institutional detail necessary to form a working government. 106 Post-ratification
practice (defined broadly to include not simply informal actions but also sub-constitutional
enactments and judicial decisions) has filled that gap. Many features of the early practice—
such as the rejection of impeachment as a remedy for perceived judicial errors, 107 the
prohibition on common law crimes,108 the bar on advisory opinions,109 the crucial
distinction between remedies against the sovereign and remedies against the sovereign’s
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See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 132-42 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 224–225 (1911) (noting a “prejudice
against the system of English Common Law” in the years following the Revolution).
102

See, e.g., Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of Its Reception in the United States, 4 VAND. L.
REV. 791 (1951).
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See, e.g., U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9 (protecting the common law writ of habeas corpus); amdt. VII (protecting
the common law right to a civil jury trial).
104

See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE
ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (1975) (discussing the continuity of common law practice in the
state courts before and after the Revolution); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part II, 133 U.
PA. L. REV. 1231, 1234-41 (1985) (surveying the continuing importance of the English common law in the
early Republic after independence).
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See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (observing that a constitution’s
“nature . . . requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated”).
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422-25 (2009).
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See, e.g., Gary D. Rowe, Note, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, the
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See Correspondence of the Justices (1793), collected in HART & WECHSLER, supra note 41, at 50-52
(declining to render an advisory opinion on legal questions involving the interpretation of treaties with France
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officers,110 and the requirement that judicial judgments be immune from non-judicial
revision111—have endured for centuries.
Prescription is a fundamentally pre-democratic rationale for legal norms. As I will
show, however, it persists throughout American legal practice. The most obvious example
is the reception by the post-revolutionary American states of the English common law.
While the reception itself was generally accomplished by legislative adoption and therefore
a matter of democratic choice, the reception statutes made no effort to review and
distinguish among substantive common law norms. Rather, reception was a democratic
decision to adopt the pre-revolutionary law simply because it had been the law for a very
long time and its results were generally perceived to be satisfactory. Just as the English
legal system had transitioned from monarchy to parliamentary democracy over time, while
retaining the common law and any number of other pre-democratic survivals, the newlyindependent American colonists grafted a new commitment to constitutionalism onto preconstitutional English system that, in most respects, was thought to be working reasonably
well. There was no Bastille to storm, and no French revolutionary-style effort to rethink
the legal system from the ground up.112
Both the nature of the prescriptive legal sources adopted in American law and the
dynamics of their integration with majoritarian democracy and constitutionalism have
important implications for the ways prescriptive practice can function in constitutional
interpretation. As I hope to demonstrate in the remainder of this essay, prescriptive practice
has always played an important and pervasive constitutive role. Reliance on past practice
absolved the successful revolutionaries of any need to make the world anew; it allowed
them to rely on pre-existing institutions and norms, holding most of the legal system
constant and allowing them to focus on articulating the limited but important ways in which
the new government would differ from the old.113 But the notion of entrenching past
practice would have run counter to both the way those practices had always worked and
the new commitments to majoritarianism and constitutionalism. The English common law
See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 857 (1824) (articulating the “party of
record” rule that a suit against the government’s officers will not be treated as against the sovereign for
purposes of sovereign immunity); see also United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) (permitting a suit against
military officers acting on behalf of the United States to proceed); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)
(holding that state sovereign immunity does not bar a suit against a state officer for prospective relief).
110
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had generally not been entrenched, but—like the rest of English law, including
constitutional law—had remained subject to alteration by a sovereign Parliament.114 And
the Philadelphia convention rejected proposals for a common law reception provision in
the Constitution itself precisely because that might have rendered the common law
immutable.
I do not argue here that historical practices should never be treated as shaping or
supplementing constitutional meaning in a way that cannot be modified through ordinary
legislation. But we should be terribly cautious about doing that. It is, after all, a mode of
constitutional interpretation with little support in historical practice.
II.

Historical Practice in Federal Courts Law

This Part explores a variety of elements of federal courts law that, in one way or
another, involve reliance on historical practices. I begin with three sets of familiar
phenomena: judicial reliance on past decisions under the doctrine of stare decisis; federal
incorporation of preexisting bodies of law, such as the English common law; and use of
the canons of construction in interpreting federal statutes. These phenomena are so familiar
that we generally do not think of them as part of the broader category of reliance on
historical practice that figures in cases like Noel Canning or Zivotofsky.
Federal courts law does rely on practice in ways more analogous to Noel Canning
and Zivotofsky. The basic structure of federal jurisdiction, such as the scope of the Supreme
Court’s review in cases arising under state law or in the state courts, have acquired a strong
sociological entrenchment arising from longstanding practice.115 The availability and
parameters of habeas corpus review are largely framed by practice.116 And the amenability
of senior executive officials to federal judicial process has been established largely by the
President’s decision to comply at key points in our history.117 Nonetheless, a key part of
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See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739-52 (2008) (canvassing both English and early American
practice on judicial review of executive detention, although concluding that the common that did not
definitively answer the question before the Court); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473-75, 481-82 (2004)
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my argument is that reliance on practice is pervasive and routine, and that reliance on past
practice in these more prosaic settings can shed important light on the broader
phenomenon.
A.

Judicial Precedent

We generally think of judicial precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis as their
own modality of interpretation—not part of a broader reliance on historical practice.118 But
generally speaking, the “practice” that courts engage in overwhelmingly involves the
decision of cases. There are, to be sure, certain aspects of internal housekeeping, such as
the assignment of panels and cases or the Supreme Court’s certiorari policies,119 as well
as certain rulemaking functions of broader significance,120 where judges engage in
“practices” outside the decision of cases.121 But the overwhelming majority of judicial
practice consists of deciding cases. The influence that past decisions have in resolving
present controversies is the most familiar example of judicial reliance on past practice—so
familiar, in fact, that judges following precedent may be no more aware that they are
invoking historical practice than Molière’s bourgeois gentleman was that he was speaking
prose.122
Judicial precedent fits my definition of practice in two distinct respects. First, a
prior decision is itself a past act by another actor that lacks direct binding authority on a
current dispute. A judicial decision’s direct binding force is generally limited to the parties;
this force is captured by the doctrine of res judicata, not stare decisis.123 The influence of
the past court’s decision is also conceptually distinct from the binding force of the
underlying positive law—typically, a statute or constitutional provision—that the prior
See, e.g., BOBBITT, supra note 38, at 13 (identifying the “doctrinal” modality of “applying rules generated
by precedent”).
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decision applied. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s recent patent law decision
in Bilski v. Kappos.124 Section 101 of the Patent Act broadly states that “[w]hoever invents
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.”125 Nonetheless,
“[t]he Court’s precedents provide three specific exceptions” for “‘laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas.’”126 Acknowledging that “these exceptions are not required
by the statutory text,” the Court observed that “they are consistent with the notion that a
patentable process must be ‘new and useful.’”127 “And in any case,” the Court said, “these
exceptions have defined the reach of the statute as a matter of statutory stare decisis going
back 150 years.”128 Bilski is thus a particularly self-conscious example of a course of
decisions, taking place over an extended period of time, that supplements the meaning of
the original textual provision that those decisions interpret and apply.
In constitutional law, the originalist critique of stare decisis has long insisted that
judicial precedents interpreting the Constitution are not the same—and consequently lack
the same authority—as the authoritative document itself.129 For our purposes, the Supreme
Court’s decision interpreting the Recess Appointments Clause in Noel Canning is not
intrinsically different from the Congressional and Executive interpretations of the Clause
that the justices debated in their opinions. Both involve interpretations of a constitutional
provision by one or another branch of government at some time in the past. In the next
dispute raising a recess appointments issue, the Noel Canning opinion will be one more
past practice interpreting the clause that may bear on the present dispute.130 The relative
authority of past judicial interpretations vis-à-vis executive or legislative interpretations
turns on complex matters of separation of powers, the res judicata effect of prior judgments
on the original parties, the remedies granted in the prior litigation, and the like.131 But if
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judicial precedents are typically more binding than legislative or executive ones,132 it is not
because adherence to judicial decisions is any less a matter of deferring to historical
practice.
Second, the rule of stare decisis—that is, the respect that judges accord to prior
decisions—is itself a judicial practice. The Constitution does not itself explicitly articulate
a rule of precedent, and the Supreme Court has said that stare decisis is simply “‘a principle
of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.’”133 The various
nuances of the doctrine of precedent—the factors involved in its application, for example,
or the notion that precedent binds more strongly in statutory cases than in constitutional
ones—are likewise simply rules of practice distilled from the Court’s long experience
deciding cases.134 When courts follow the rule of stare decisis, they are adhering to the
way they have done things in the past.
Notwithstanding the Court’s statements that stare decisis is a “principle of policy,”
one often sees arguments that stare decisis is inherent in the meaning of the “judicial
power” conferred on the federal courts in Article III. 135 I have considerable sympathy for
that view, but I want to remain agnostic about it here. The important point is that the Article
III claim is itself a good example of constitutional argument grounded in historical practice.
Judge Richard Arnold’s famous opinion in Anastasoff, for example, urged that “in the late
eighteenth century, the doctrine of precedent was well-established in legal practice (despite
the absence of a reporting system), regarded as an immemorial custom, and valued for its
role in past struggles for liberty.”136 Judge Arnold’s view treats practice as a gloss on
Article III’s “judicial power”; the Supreme Court’s more conventional invocation of stare
decisis as a “rule of policy” accords that practice its own independent force. But whether
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courts respect stare decisis as a gloss on Article III or simply because it is a longstanding
way of proceeding, the authority of past cases rests on past practice.
Like other forms of reliance on historical practice, the doctrine of precedent takes
into account the actions of actors outside the courts. Precedential weight varies, for
example, according to whether other actors may correct the courts’ errors. Hence, the Court
has said that “‘[c]onsiderations of stare decisis have special force in the area
of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation,
the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have
done.’”137 One can also frame this point as one of acquiescence: If Congress has not
overridden a court’s past construction of a statute, it may be read as agreeing with (or at
least accepting) that construction.138 Further, the reliance inquiry built into the stare decisis
doctrine assesses whether other actors—most often private individuals but also public
actors such as state governments—will be adversely affected by overruling a prior
decision.139
The precedential value of a prior decision often seems more categorical than the
sorts of non-judicial practices at issue in Noel Canning or Zivotofsky. But when courts call
precedents into question, the similarities between stare decisis and other practice-based
forms of argument come into focus. Consider, for example, the debate in District of
Columbia v. Heller140 concerning the force of the Court’s prior decision in United States v.
Miller,141 which had seemed to embrace an interpretation of the Second Amendment
grounded in militia service. In urging the Court to follow Miller, Justice Stevens’s dissent
emphasized that “hundreds of judges have relied on the view of the Amendment we
endorsed there.”142 The majority instead stressed defects in the Miller Court’s decisional
process, such as the defendant’s failure to appear and the Court’s own failure to discuss the
Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991) (quoting Patterson v.
McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989)).
137
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history of the Second Amendment143—much as the Justices in Zivotofsky and Noel
Canning debated the extent to which past legislative and executive practices reflected
considered constitutional judgments or had been consistent over time. Although in
principle a single decision may set a binding precedent, repetition, longevity, and
consensus plainly matter.144 Indeed, some justices seem increasingly unwilling to accept a
single decision, or even a course of a few decisions, as binding until they have been
repeatedly reaffirmed over an extended period.145 It may well be that courts generally view
stare decisis as more obligatory than reliance on other forms of historical practice, but these
sorts of examples demonstrate that there is no difference in kind.
Finally, the reasons that we follow past judicial interpretations are basically the
same as those for deferring to other forms of historical practice. They involve the same
notions of intellectual humility and the need to avoid social disruption that Burke invoked
in defense of prescription:
An ignorant man, who is not fool enough to meddle with his clock, is,
however, sufficiently confident to think he can safely take to pieces and put
together, at his pleasure, a moral machine of another guise, importance, and
complexity, composed of far other wheels and springs and balances and
counteracting and cooperating powers. Men little think how immorally they
act in rashly meddling with what they do not understand. Their delusive
good intention is no sort of excuse for their presumption. They who truly
mean well must be fearful of acting ill.146
There is no a priori reason to think that judges today are smarter than the judges of
yesteryear, and longstanding precedents that have been continually applied and reaffirmed
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carry the endorsement of a much larger court than the present one.147 As Burke’s
mechanical metaphor suggests, any given precedent may have become integrated into the
legal mechanism such that the effects of overruling it may be hard to anticipate. And
judicial precedent also performs a settlement function, allowing the work of the law to
proceed without reinventing the wheel in every new case.148 As Charles Fried has put it,
“[w]e want to avoid being like the man who cannot get to work in the morning because he
must keep returning home to make quite sure he has turned off the gas.”149 But reliance on
other forms of historical practice—at least where they are not contested—also performs
this function. At least for purposes of the present discussion, it is hard to see any reason to
distinguish in principle between reliance on settled judicial practices of interpretation
(precedent) and reliance on other forms of historical practice.
B.

Incorporation of Extant Bodies of Law

A related form of reliance on primarily judicial practice occurs in the many different
areas where the law of federal jurisdiction incorporates pre-existing (and generally very
old) bodies of non-constitutional law. Sometimes this incorporation has been mandated by
statute. In the Process Acts of 1789 and 1792, for example, Congress required federal
courts adjudicating suits at law to follow the forms of proceeding in the states in which
they sat;150 this generally meant that they would follow the English common law, as
received by the relevant American state.151 In equity and admiralty cases, the 1792 Act
directed federal courts to employ the forms of proceeding used by English equity and
admiralty courts.152 Likewise, the federal piracy statute incorporates the definition of piracy
in “the law of nations.”153
In other areas, the federal courts have taken it upon themselves to adopt these preexisting bodies of law. Courts have grounded the sovereign immunity of government
institutions—both federal and state—in the common law tradition inherited from
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England.154 The individual immunities of government officers have similar roots.155 The
various abstention doctrines rest in substantial part on the discretionary practices of English
common law and equity courts,156 and equity practice likewise provides remedies against
unlawful state action.157 Although the admiralty provisions of both Article III and the
various judiciary acts are purely jurisdictional in form and do not specify the body of law
to be applied, federal courts have read those provisions to incorporate the general maritime
law, or lex mercatoria, which is a form of customary international law.158
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The history of the “general common law” provides a particularly striking example
of judicial incorporation of preexisting law. Cases like Swift v. Tyson159 read the Rules of
Decision Act160 to permit federal courts sitting in diversity to apply the general commercial
law—another subclass of customary international law that was, as Justice Story explained,
“not the law of a single country only, but of the commercial world.” 161 In the latter case,
the law incorporated practice in a double sense: Swift adopted the practices of prior courts
(including state and foreign courts) in applying the general commercial law, and that law
itself derived its norms from the customs of merchants engaged in commercial
intercourse.162 When Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins163 overruled Swift, it hardly rejected
this process of incorporation; rather, it required federal courts to defer more strictly to the
practices of the several states, which had themselves incorporated the lex mercatoria and
the common law.164 And in cases where courts continue to make federal common law based
on the presence of uniquely federal interests, they have continued to draw on the general
commercial law.165
Federal courts law incorporates the English common law and equitable practice, as
well as the broader customs of maritime and commercial law, as a pragmatic solution to
the generality of the Article III judicial power and its instantiation in the various judiciary
acts. The Framers of these mandates left innumerable questions unanswered, and they
could afford to do so because the common law background either already answered them
or provided resources to do so in the future. As Peter Du Ponceau put it in the early
Nineteenth Century, “[w] live in the midst of the common law, we inhale it at every breath,
imbibe it at every pore . . . [and] cannot learn another system of laws without learning at
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the same time another language.”166 Rebels against British rule, the founding generation
nonetheless saw little need—and perhaps had little ability—to remodel the entire legal
system; instead, the preexisting law shaped the new government at every turn.167 Federal
courts law maintains this basic conservatism today, preferring in nearly every instance “off
the shelf” solutions based on some preexisting source of law to formulating new legal rules
out of whole cloth.168
This sort of incorporation is by no means confined to federal courts law, of course.
Search and seizure law, for example, incorporates important elements of the common law
of property. In assessing the reasonableness of a search, the Court has noted “the great
significance given to widely shared social expectations, which are naturally enough
influenced by the law of property, but not controlled by its rules.”169 The substantive due
process cases have frequently invoked common law principles in defining the “liberty”
protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.170 More broadly, the Court’s
incorporation jurisprudence applying the Bill of Rights to the States relies not on Justice
Black’s theory that the Fourteenth Amendment rendered the first eight amendments
directly authoritative in state cases, but rather on the more indirect notion that the Bill of
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PETER DU PONCEAU, A DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF THE
UNITED STATES 91 (1824).
See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 104, at 67 (“There is no evidence that any of the men who led Massachusetts
into the War of Independence or any of those who followed acted for the purpose of bringing about
fundamental changes in the rules and institutions of which the legal system was comprised. . . . The legal
system that emerged from the war was, in short, virtually identical to the old colonial legal system.”); Sachs,
supra note 105, at 1821-23. Professor Nelson goes on to document that “thereafter change was dramatic,”
id., but these changes had to do with adapting the common law to the needs of the growing republic and
important shifts in the responsibilities of judge and jury; there was no wholesale rejection of English law. See
id. at 8-10, 165-74.
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Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989)).
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Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006). See also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949-51
(2012) (acknowledging the reliance of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on the common law of trespass);
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See, e.g., Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-70 (1990) (relying
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Rights provides a helpful guide to identifying the principles of “fundamental fairness” that
the Fourteenth Amendment protects.171 As the younger Justice Harlan put it, “the Bill of
Rights is evidence . . . of the content Americans find in the term ‘liberty’ and of American
standards of fundamental fairness.”172
My friend and colleague Stephen Sachs has described our English inheritance of
the common law and equity principles as a “constitutional backdrop.” He rightly observes
that “[o]ur founding document is firmly rooted in the common law tradition, in which each
new enactment is layered on top of an existing and enormously complex body of written
and unwritten law.”173 Professor Sachs’s discussion is tremendously helpful in illuminating
the extent to which our legal system in general—and constitutional law in particular—
builds on a body of preexisting legal principles and practices. But exploring the
divergences between Sachs’s account and my own will help illuminate the approach
advanced here.
A “backdrop,” as Professor Sachs uses the term, is not “historical practice” as I
have defined it. An historical practice, for my purposes, is a prior action or rule that does
not bind directly within the context of the dispute in which it is invoked. The Constitution
itself is not “practice,” because it binds us today as law; neither are the portions of the 1789
Judiciary Act that remain in effect today. But the early Presidents’ tendency to issue
Thanksgiving Day proclamations is a practice that might be relevant to contemporary
disputes about the meaning of the Establishment Clause, because they may reflect a
longstanding view about the permissibility of official invocations of the Deity. 174 At the
same time, of course, those proclamations themselves have no binding force in
contemporary Establishment Clause litigation.
For Professor Sachs, legal backdrops are relevant precisely because they continue
to have binding legal force today. Because “the Constitution left most preexisting law
alone,” he says, “[a]ny legal rule that wasn’t abrogated by the Constitution’s enactment
simply kept on trucking after 1788.”175 Hence, the English Common law, equity practice,
and other bodies of preexisting law “remained in force subject to the Constitution’s
requirements, to the privileged status of federal law under the Supremacy Clause, and to
the ordinary processes of abrogation, amendment, and repeal.”176 For Sachs, the common
law is relevant because it simply remains the law—not because it is a practice that may
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influence the interpretation of existing law or, in some way, supplement the traditionallybinding legal materials. Moreover, what makes the common law a constitutional backdrop
is that it is “preserved from change” in various ways.177
Certainly some aspects of the common law, equity practice, or other forms of
preexisting law have continuing force in our legal system.178 But the transition from
English to American law was not seamless,179 and it differed at the national and state levels.
The states did not simply allow the English common law to continue in force. Rather, they
expressly “received” it into state law through specific reception statutes or provisions in
state constitutions,180 and they took only those portions they found applicable to their local
conditions.181 And the framers of the national Constitution explicitly debated—but
rejected—a parallel reception of the English common law into national law.182 Writing to
St. George Tucker, John Marshall stated that “I do not believe one man can be found” who
maintains “that the common law of England has . . . been adopted as the common law of
America by the Constitution of the United States.”183 Nor is there any federal statute
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See generally Hall, supra note 102, at 805-07; PAUL REINSCH, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE EARLY
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conceptions were conditioned by, and their terminology derived from, the common law, the early colonists
were far from applying it as a technical system, they often ignored it or denied its subsidiary force, and they
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See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-1 (“All such parts of the common law as were heretofore in force and
use within this State, or so much of the common law as is not destructive of, or repugnant to, or inconsistent
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the common law through judicial decision. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Walker, 21 Conn. 168, 181 (1851) (“We
have, in our judicial practice, adopted so much of the common law as was operative as law, in the fatherland, when our ancestors left it, and which was adapted to the new state of things here, under our colonial
condition. This was our inheritance.”).
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receiving the common law en masse into national law. Hence, the Supreme Court in
Wheaton v. Peters found it “clear there can be no common law of the United States. . . .
The common law could be made a part of our federal system only by legislative adoption.
When, therefore, a common law right is asserted, we must look to the state in which the
controversy originated.”184
English rules of common law and equity, as well as the broader corpus of maritime
law, thus do not become part of federal law because they simply remained in force
notwithstanding “the late unpleasantness”—to borrow a Civil War euphemism—between
Britain and its American colonies. Rather, they come in because particular provisions of
federal law, such as the Process Acts or the Admiralty Clause in Article III, adopted them,
or because federal judges, using their more limited authority to adopt federal common law
rules to govern the cases before them, imported them as helpful “off-the-shelf” solutions
to problems arising in federal litigation. As such, these older bodies of law were practices,
whose legal force depended on a current decision to accept them as binding. In most
situations, this conceptual hair-splitting will make little difference. But it does matter when
aspects of the English “backdrop” are argued to be entrenched against change by ordinary
legal means185—a problem I return to in Part III.
Incorporation of preexisting bodies of law may have a dynamic as well as a
conservative impact on the law. Just as state courts used the common lawmaking powers
that they received along with the substantive English common law to adapt that law to the
context of the growing American states,186 so too federal court law has adapted as it adopted
preexisting bodies of law. The federal Constitution explicitly incorporated the English
of Delegates, Session of 1799–1800, Concerning Alien and Sedition Laws, in 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
381 (G. Hunt ed. 1906) (rejecting any general reception of the common law into federal law).
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834). Professor Sachs writes that “the decision in Wheaton didn’t actually get
rid of the “common law of the United States,” citing admiralty law as a counter-example. Sachs, supra note
105, at 1883. But maritime law was not treated as federal law until the Supreme Court’s much-criticized
decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). See Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note
158, at 319-25; Fletcher, supra note 161, at 1549. Moreover, maritime law has not generally been understood
as synonymous with “common law.” See also Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S.
354, 364-66 (1959) (holding that “admiralty” is a distinct class of jurisdiction from “suits . . . at common law
or in equity . . . arising under the . . . laws of the United States”); Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law:
A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1280-83 (1996) (demonstrating maritime law’s roots
in customary international law); Tetley, supra note 158, at 109-14 (documenting the origins of maritime law
in the law of nations). Likewise, it is relatively well settled that the general commercial law applied under
Swift v. Tyson was not considered federal. See Fletcher, supra note 161, at 1575. Its force depended on state
choice of law rules mandating its application in commercial cases. See BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note
162, at 72-73.
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common law writ of habeas corpus as a restraint on executive detention,187 but the
Reconstruction Congress extended the writ to persons in state custody and the Supreme
Court ultimately interpreted it as a basis for collateral attack on state convictions 188—a
remedy directed to the unique problems of American federalism. English admiralty law
extended only to tidal waters, but American law stretched it to cover all navigable
waterways by 1851, which had the intended effect of extending federal maritime
jurisdiction to cover a broad swath of interstate commerce.189 And the Supreme Court has
both received and adapted the English common law of sovereign immunity—building upon
such English remedies as the petition of right but then extending them to wholly new
contexts, such as damages actions against law enforcement officers—to construct a
relatively flexible array of remedies against government officials for constitutional
violations.190
Federal courts law’s incorporation of preexisting bodies of law thus illustrates the
flip-side of prescriptive authority, that is, its pairing of respect for the past with enablement
of incremental change and reform. The most eloquent account of “living constitutionalism”
in American law, the younger Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman,191 is grounded
187
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which focused instead on whether extra-judicial detention—most often by the executive—was authorized by
law.”).
189
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See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 196 (1882) (recognizing that the national government
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(extending officer suits to state officers and claims for prospective relief that do not rest on invasion of a
common law interest); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
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squarely in the common law method. By incorporating preexisting bodies of law that
themselves presuppose a strong role for judicial elaboration over time, this form of reliance
on past practice also injects a degree of fluidity into federal courts doctrine.
C.

Canons of Statutory Construction

The canons of statutory construction defer to historical practice in at least three
senses. The first is that most of these rules themselves represent venerable traditions of
interpretation. Abbe Gluck’s recent work has investigated the fascinating and difficult
question whether methodologies of statutory construction are themselves law—so that, for
instance, federal courts interpreting state statutes would be required to apply state canons
of construction.192 But whether or not that is true, there is no doubt that the canons also
represent longstanding regularities of practice within the judiciary.193 Federal courts apply
the canons because previous courts have applied those canons. And the stability of the
canons is thought to provide a baseline against which Congress can legislate.194
The second and third ways in which the canons defer to historical practice turn on
the nature of the canon in question. The statutory interpretation literature generally divides
rules of interpretation into two classes: descriptive canons, which embody judgments about
how the enacting legislature most likely would have preferred to resolve ambiguities that
arise within a statute; and normative canons, which implement other values that the

while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound. No formula could serve as
a substitute, in this area, for judgment and restraint.
Id.; see also Planned Parenthood of Eastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848-50 (1992) (plurality opinion of
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (adopting Harlan’s reasoning); Young, Rediscovering Conservatism,
supra note 40, at 695 (arguing that “Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe demonstrates the application of the
common-law model [of constitutionalism] to resolve actual cases”).
See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine,
120 YALE. L. J. 1898 (2011).
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the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 929 (2013).

34

legislature may or may not share.195 Descriptive canons generally seek to assess legislative
preferences by reference to regularities in past legislative practice—the judgment, for
example, that when the legislature passes a new statute, it generally does not mean to
disrupt other aspects of the law unless it specifically says that it does. These canons thus
embody deference to past legislative practice.
Normative canons, on the other hand, are problematic precisely because they so
often fly in the face of likely legislative preference.196 The rule of lenity, for example, holds
that “when there are two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other,
we are to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite
language.”197 This approach cannot, to put it mildly, plausibly rest on a judgment that
legislators generally look out for and mean to protect the interests of criminal defendants;
rather, it is traditionally justified as protecting due process values of fair notice.198 As the
rule of lenity suggests, sometimes normative canons trace directly to constitutional
principles. Often, however, the values protected are more diffuse. The rule disfavoring
repeals of preexisting law by implication from a new statute, 199 for example, is hard to
ground in any specific constitutional principle.
David Shapiro has demonstrated, however, that canons like the one against implied
repeals serve a broader function of maintaining continuity and coherence in the law. For
Professor Shapiro, the most important interpretive canons “are those that aid in reading
statutes against the entire background of existing customs, practices, rights, and
obligations—in other words, those that emphasize the importance of not changing existing
understandings any more than is needed to implement the statutory objective.”200 This view
of the canons takes in those rules of construction, like the rule of lenity or the presumption
against preemption,201 that point to specific constitutional principles, because those canons
harmonize new laws with those principles without forcing an evaluation of actual
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constitutional conflict.202 But as the rule against implied repeals suggests, Shapiro’s notion
of coherence also includes integration with the vast mass of preexisting subconstitutional
law.203 The canons respect the fact that subconstitutional law often plays a critical role in
constituting our institutions, so that a repeal of a preexisting statute, regulation, or common
law doctrine may be just as disruptive as a statute that undermines some constitutional
value.204
Professor Shapiro’s notion of statutory construction as an instrument of continuity
with past practice is nowhere more apparent than with respect to statutes construing the
authority of the federal courts. In Murdock v. Memphis,205 the Supreme Court construed an
amendment to the statutory section prescribing the Court’s jurisdiction over appeals from
the state courts to permit only review of federal questions, not any state law issues that
might also be necessary to resolve the entire dispute. It did so notwithstanding a recent
amendment that arguably broadened the Court’s jurisdiction, noting that if it were Congress
intent to “revers[e] the policy of the government from its foundation in one of the most
important subjects on which [Congress] could act, it is reasonably to be expected that
Congress would use plain, unmistakable language in giving expression to such
intention.”206
A different result in Murdock would have disrupted the established relationship
between state and federal law. As Martha Field has explained, if the U.S. Supreme Court
could substitute its own view of state law for that of the highest state court, “it would not
be possible to identify any body of law as ‘state law.’ It is thus because of Murdock that
the whole concept of state law as distinct from federal law is a meaningful one.” 207 While
Murdock purported only to construe the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional statute, then, it is a
profoundly constitutive decision; it is, as Professor Field observes, “such a fundamental
part of our way of thinking about the boundary between state and federal power that many
of our suppositions, constitutional and otherwise, are built upon it.”208 The Court’s
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construction of the statutory amendment was thus predicated on the need to ensure
continuity with this broader web of past (and ongoing) practices.
Likewise, the Court’s jurisdiction-stripping precedents—which consistently
construe jurisdictional statutes in such a way as to minimize encroachments on the
longstanding scope of federal jurisdiction—demonstrate the strength of the continuity
impulse even in the teeth of aggressive new statutory language. 209 In INS v. St. Cyr,210 for
example, the Court confronted a statutory text that seemed unequivocally to deprive federal
courts of jurisdiction to review deportation orders. The Illegal immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) provided that “[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal
against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed” certain enumerated
criminal offenses.”211 Nonetheless, the Court found that this provision was not sufficiently
clear to proscribe review by writ of habeas corpus. “[T]o conclude that the writ is no longer
available in this context would represent a departure from historical practice in immigration
law,” the Court said, noting that “[t]he writ of habeas corpus has always been available to
review the legality of Executive detention.”212 Moreover, the Court’s prior precedents had
demanded explicit textual references to habeas corpus in order to foreclose that remedy—
a reference that, for all its aggressive language, the IIRIRA provision failed to include.213
Amanda Tyler has explained that St. Cyr and similar cases rely on “a combination
of the canon against implied repeals and a clear statement rule protecting structural
harmony, as well as a heavy dose of stare decisis—namely, continuing and strong reliance
on the model set forth in Yerger.”214 One might also think of the Court’s requirement of a
super-strong clear statement in order to cut off federal jurisdiction as embodying a
constitutional norm against jurisdiction stripping, albeit one defeasible by Congress if it
acts with sufficient clarity.215 These two views are not necessarily in tension. Hard
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constitutional limits on jurisdiction-stripping are hard to identify,216 and the strongest
arguments against such measures will generally be that they fly in the face of centuries of
institutional practice concerning the relationship between Congress, the federal courts, and
the courts of the states.217 The canons of construction, in Professor Shapiro’s model, exist
primarily as a means for ensuring that new legislation does not unduly disrupt such
practices. What cases like St. Cyr illustrate most vividly is that the canons may be employed
to enforce such continuity even in the teeth of what Congress almost surely intends. 218
Of course, not everyone accepts Professor Shapiro’s view of statutory construction
as a means primarily of maintaining continuity with the past. As Professor Tyler points out,
“proponents of an engineering vision of courts in the realm of statutory interpretation
generally contend for an interpretive approach by which courts ‘update’ the legislature’s
work and absolve that body of the need to police judicial constructions that may no longer
remain in keeping with prevailing political or social norms.”219 William Eskridge thus
argues that statutes “should—like the Constitution and the common law—be interpreted
‘dynamically,’ that is, in light of their present societal, political, and legal context.”220
But as Professor Eskridge’s invocation of the common law suggests, even
“dynamic” takes on statutory interpretation are not fundamentally inconsistent with an
emphasis on continuity with past practice. In Burke’s thought, organic growth is the
flipside of prescriptive authority. For Burke, “the idea of inheritance furnishes a pure
principle of conservation, and a sure principle of transmission, without at all excluding a
principle of improvement.”221 In Swift v. Tyson,222 for example, Justice Story construed the
Rules of Decision Act to be consistent with preexisting practice—in both America and
elsewhere—extracting a general body of commercial law principles from the customs of
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merchants.223 Maintaining continuity with that longstanding practice also solidified the
dynamic role of the federal courts in developing a nationally uniform body of commercial
principles.224
But Burke insisted on an incremental method of change in which "[b]y “slow but
well-sustained progress, the effect of each step is watched,” and that any reforms
“procee[d] upon the principle of reference to antiquity . . . [and] be carefully formed upon
analogical precedent, authority, and example.”225 As later students of Burke have pointed
out, this is the method of the common law tradition, whereby “custom was constantly being
subjected to the test of experience, so that if immemorial it was, equally, always up to
date.”226 Justice Story’s general commercial law, for example, was tied to and disciplined
by existing practice and the need to coordinate with other courts applying the same body
of law.227 Much as the common law tradition has frequently facilitated organic growth in
American constitutionalism,228 so too the canons of interpretation have facilitated
institutional change by cushioning the shocks that might otherwise deter or short-circuit
reform.229
III.

The Constitutive and Entrenchment Effects of Practice

The doctrines just discussed hardly exhaust the many ways in which federal courts
law incorporates and defers to historical practice. Indeed, I have left out many of the more
prominent examples in order to shine some light on instances where the dynamic may be
less obvious. But the examples I have highlighted are enough, I think, to support a few
more general points about deference to historical practice in this area. Crucially, federal
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courts law uses historical practice in ways that diverge from its use in high-profile
separation of powers disputes like Noel Canning and Zivotofsky. It is, I suggest, a mistake
to focus only on these “big cases.”
Two points of divergence are critical. First, federal courts law uses practice
primarily to supplement and fill gaps in other sources of binding law—not to “gloss” the
meaning of particular constitutional provisions. Largely because of this, federal courts law
rarely entrenches past practice against change by ordinary legal means. Second, federal
courts law generally does not rely on some theory of acquiescence by the other branches
to justify reliance on past practice. In many settings, such acquiescence seems largely
beside the point. Instead, the examples I have canvassed tend to rely on practice based on
its longstanding pedigree. Federal courts law thus embraces—albeit often implicitly—a
prescriptive rationale for past practice. I argue below that this rationale is normatively
superior to an acquiescence model of historical practice.
A.

The Non-Entrenchment of Practice in Federal Courts Law

The vast majority of historical practices I have surveyed help constitute our judicial
institutions—and in this sense properly fall under the rubric of “constitutional”
interpretation—without entrenching those practices against change by ordinary political
processes. The constitutive and entrenchment functions of constitutional law do not
necessarily run together, and in federal courts law one frequently sees the former without
the latter. This is true of each set of practices surveyed in the preceding Part.
The common law, for example, has generally been defeasible by statute; indeed, it
was generally received into American law under the express condition that this would be
so.230 Both state and federal legislatures have interstitially supplanted that body of law as
they deemed necessary.231 Specific imports—such as the common law immunities of
individual government officers or the equitable principles built into the abstention
doctrines—can be modified or repealed by legislation.232 Likewise, both the general
230
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maritime law and the general commercial law have often been altered or superseded by
federal and state legislation.233
The canons of construction are likewise largely unentrenched. This is obviously
true with respect to the canons’ impact on construction of particular statutes; where canons
grounded in established practice influence the construction of a statute, Congress may
override the courts’ work.234 The same thing is generally true of the canons themselves.
Certainly the courts themselves change the canons over time, employing them more
insistently in some eras than others, creating new canons from time to time, and allowing
others to fall into disuse. To the considerable extent that descriptive canons of construction
reflect patterns of legislative practice, they necessarily change as that practice changes over
time.235 Congress is able to control the process of interpretation by legislating general rules
of construction (although these are often ignored)236 and by enacting interpretive principles
in particular statutes.237
The harder question is whether Congress may override particular normative
canons—particularly those grounded in constitutional values. Although I cannot develop
the point here, an attempt to prevent the courts from considering constitutional principles
in statutory cases would present grave separation of powers concerns.238 When Congress
has effectively sought to do so, its actions seem best understood not as precluding the courts
1037, 1127 (2001) (discussing Congress’s power to override the doctrine of qualified immunity for
government officers).
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from considering the constitution but as either an exercise of its considerable power over
remedies or a restriction on the courts’ jurisdiction to decide a class of cases at all. But the
critical point remains that canons set only default rules, and so Congress can always
overcome them simply by clearly expressing its intent. In this ultimate sense, no canon is
entrenched.
Judicial precedent presents a more difficult case. We must consider, first, the
practice of stare decisis itself, and second, the entrenchment of particular decisions.
Scholars have debated whether Congress may override the doctrine of stare decisis by
statute.239 If there is a limit on this option, however, it seems likely to stem from general
separation of powers concerns about the encroachment of one branch into the functions of
another—not from a notion that stare decisis is itself constitutionally entrenched. Certainly
courts have long felt free to tailor the rules of stare decisis to particular situations and to
set the force of precedent aside under particular circumstances. Even if some basic level of
precedential force is constitutionally entrenched, that protection is unlikely to extend to the
varied details of current practice with respect to precedents.
What about the entrenchment of particular decisions? Most judicial precedents, of
course, are not constitutional ones and thus can generally be altered or overridden by
ordinary legislation.240 That is ordinarily not possible in constitutional cases,241 but the
Court has compensated by lowering the threshold for judicial overruling of constitutional
precedents.242 Moreover, the elements of the Court’s stare decisis calculus—especially the
workability of the prior precedent and changes to its legal or factual underpinnings—speak
directly to concerns about entrenchment of past practice in the face of a changing world.243
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Constitutional precedents are largely entrenched against change from outside the Court,
however,244 and that has made the Court’s frequent recourse to a common law-like
approach to constitutional development controversial.245
Even in the context of high-profile inter-branch disputes, the Court has generally
been reluctant to entrench practice against change through ordinary legislation. The
Youngstown concurrences, for example, viewed presidential authority as largely a function
of congressional authorization or prohibition. Both Justices Jackson and Frankfurter turned
to past practice in service of that inquiry—that is, they looked to past practice to determine
whether Congress had, in fact, authorized or prohibited the sort of executive action in
question.246 But nothing in this approach entrenched the past practice against legislative
change; even in areas where Congress had broadly authorized (or at least acquiesced in)
executive action, Congress remained free to repeal that authorization and replace it with a
prohibition.
However, the Court’s most recent presidential power decision—Zivotofsky v.
Kerry —goes a giant step further. In that case, the majority concluded from past practice
not only that the President has authority to endorse or not endorse the claims of foreign
sovereigns to particular territory, but also that this power is exclusive of Congress.
Congress could not, in other words, limit the President’s authority by statute (as it had tried
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to do with respect to passports of infants born in Jerusalem).248 The past practice of
presidential recognition and congressional acquiescence had become constitutionally
entrenched; presumably the only way to strip the President of this authority now would be
to amend the Constitution.
The primary analogy in federal courts law is the Court’s state sovereign immunity
jurisprudence, which derives from longstanding common law practice a broad immunity
against private suits that is not defeasible by federal legislation.249 One might be tempted
to call this principle of immunity a “gloss” on the text of the Eleventh Amendment, but the
Court has clearly ruled out that interpretation. As Justice Kennedy has said, the phrase
“Eleventh Amendment immunity” is “convenient shorthand but something of a misnomer,
for the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms
of the Eleventh Amendment.”250 Rather, the principle of immunity supplements the text; it
is “a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification
of the Constitution, and which they retain today.”251
This is not the place to renew old debates about the soundness of the Court’s state
sovereign immunity jurisprudence. It is sufficient to say that the Court’s position is highly
controversial both on the Court and in the academy.252 Justice Stevens has written, for
example, that “[t]he kind of judicial activism manifested in cases like Seminole Tribe
[and] Alden v. Maine . . . represents such a radical departure from the proper role of this
Court that it should be opposed whenever the opportunity arises.”253 I submit that an
important driver of this controversy is the Court’s attempt to confer on freestanding
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historical practice the same constitutionally-entrenched status as the constitutional text
itself. The Court has reached “[b]ehind the words of the constitutional provisions,” as it
said in Monaco v. Mississippi, for “postulates which limit and control” based in common
law practice254—and it has entrenched those postulates against legislative alteration. As
Justice Souter pointed out in Seminole Tribe, the Court’s state immunity cases share the
“characteristic vice” of Lochner v. New York,255 in which the Court “treated the commonla background . . . as paramount, while regarding congressional legislation to abrogate the
common law . . . as constitutionally suspect.”256
I suspect that Zivotofsky, which featured the same basic notion of presidential power
immune from legislative limitation that one finds in the infamous Bush administration
“torture memos,”257 will prove similarly controversial. Entrenching practice raises a
particularly difficult boundary problem that has bedeviled most practice-based theories of
constitutional law.258 If some practices are to have constitutional status, then it becomes
critical to define with precision which practices are entrenched and which are not—and to
justify the status of the favored practices. It is often exceedingly difficult to draw that line,
and failure to draw it in a determinate and predictable way may well undermine the Court’s
legitimacy.259
This problem either does not arise or arises in a considerably more tractable form
when practices supplement other sources of law, but remain defeasible by ordinary
legislation. That is why it is often helpful to decouple the constitutive function of extraconstitutional materials, like practice, from any claim to an entrenchment function. I do not
mean to suggest that all doctrines that both supplement the constitutional text by reliance
on practice and entrench that practice against change through ordinary legal processes are
misguided. My point is simply that such instances will always be more vulnerable to
general criticisms of reliance on historical practice, such as arguments that such reliance
amounts to “constitutional adverse possession,” that it unduly freezes the progressive
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development of the law, or conversely that it provides ready fodder for judge-driven
constitutional change. I consider these criticisms in greater detail in the next section.
B.

Acquiescence and Prescription

The use of past practice in federal courts cases often displays a second difference
from its use in high-profile inter-branch controversies like Noel Canning and Zivotofsky.
In the latter sort of case, courts often ground the authority of past practice in the
acquiescence of rival branches.260 The Zivotofsky court, for example, found that “[f]rom
the first Administration forward, the President has claimed unilateral authority to recognize
foreign sovereigns,” and “[f]or the most part, Congress has acquiesced in the Executive’s
exercise of the recognition power.”261 This is not new. In Youngstown, for instance, Justice
Frankfurter emphasized the weight of presidential practice “long pursued to the knowledge
of the Congress and never before questioned.”262 Scholars have generally approved of this
practice. My colleague Jeff Powell, for example, has written that “[a]greement between the
political branches on a course of conduct is important evidence that the conduct should be
deemed constitutional.”263
Acquiescence plays a considerably less central role in federal courts cases. The
basic limitation on federal judicial power—subject matter jurisdiction—is particularly
hostile to any notion of acquiescence. “[T]he rule, springing from the nature and limits of
the judicial power of the United States is inflexible and without exception, which requires
this court, of its own motion, to deny its jurisdiction, and, in the exercise of its appellate
power, that of all other courts of the United States, in all cases where such jurisdiction does
not affirmatively appear in the record.”264 This means that “no action of the parties can
confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court. Thus, the consent of the parties is
irrelevant, principles of estoppel do not apply, and a party does not waive the requirement
by failing to challenge jurisdiction early in the proceedings.”265 As a result, “[e]very federal
appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but
also that of the lower courts in a cause under review, even though the parties are prepared
to concede it.”266 As with the parties, so too with Congress: the Court has made clear that
260

See generally Roisman, supra note 3; Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of
Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109 (1984).
261

Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091 (2015).

262

Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

H. Jefferson Powell, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective,
67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 539 (1999).
263

264

Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884).

265

Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (citations
omitted).
266

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).

46

Congress may not—by deliberate act, much less by acquiescence—confer federal
jurisdiction that Article III does not permit.267
Many federal courts cases do involve inter-institutional conflicts at some level, but
either the nature of those conflicts or the posture in which they arise may make
acquiescence less salient. For example, the Seminole Tribe case268 held that Congress may
not abrogate state sovereign immunity when it uses its general legislative powers under
Article I; it thus adjusted the allocation of power between Congress and the States. But the
opinions in that case do not speak of acquiescence. Perhaps this is because acquiescence is
more difficult to measure when it involves the actions of the fifty States vis-à-vis Congress.
Or perhaps it is because although abrogation of sovereign immunity implicates the power
of Congress over the States, it most directly affects the rights of individual plaintiffs suing
the government. We do not generally look to acquiescence to establish the Government’s
rights and immunities vis-à-vis individuals. Many instances where courts rely on past
practice in federal courts cases—such as the individual officer immunity cases or the
abstention cases—involve individual rights claims where it would seem odd to allow
Congress’s acquiescence to diminish the rights of private plaintiffs.269
Most cases involving the judicial power implicate both structural and individual
rights concerns in this way. As the Court recognized in Commodities Futures Trading
Commission v. Schor,270 for example, Article III “serves both to protect ‘the role of the
independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government’ and to
safeguard litigants’ ‘right to have claims decided before judges who are free from potential
domination by other branches of government.’”271 Schor and similar cases have held the
individual interest to be waivable, but only by the individual litigant.272 And the structural
interest is generally treated as non-waivable by such litigants.273
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Waiver of structural interests by the acquiescence of institutional actors is a more
mixed bag. In the conditional spending cases, for example, the Court has allowed states to
agree to statutory conditions that Congress could not impose directly without violating
principles of federalism.274 But the Court’s federalism cases have also rejected arguments
from acquiescence. In New York v. United States,275 for example, the Court considered
“what appears at first to be a troubling question: How can a federal statute be found an
unconstitutional infringement of state sovereignty when state officials consented to the
statute’s enactment?” Justice O’Connor’s answer stemmed from the fundamental nature of
structural principles:
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit
of the States or state governments as abstract political entities, or even for
the benefit of the public officials governing the States. To the contrary, the
Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for
the protection of individuals. . . . Where Congress exceeds its authority
relative to the States, therefore, the departure from the constitutional plan
cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state officials.276
Because structural principles benefit everyone, then, they cannot be waived or bargained
away by office-holders in particular units of the government.
One might argue that separation of powers and federalism are just different in this
regard, perhaps because the branches of the federal government are coequal interpreters of
the Constitution and (so the argument might go) the states are not. But Justice O’Connor’s
opinion in New York explicitly equated federalism and separation of powers, insisting that
“[t]he Constitution’s division of power among the three branches is violated where one
branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch
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approves the encroachment.”277 Hence, “[t]he constitutional authority of Congress cannot
be expanded by the ‘consent’ of the governmental unit whose domain is thereby narrowed,
whether that unit is the Executive Branch or the States.”278 Tellingly, Congress’s decision
to pass a law encroaching on its own powers has not generally prevented litigants from
successfully challenging such a law on separation of powers grounds. In Clinton v. New
York,279 for example, the Court struck down the line-item veto statute on separation of
powers grounds notwithstanding Congress’s own decision to back the law. Concurring,
Justice Kennedy wrote that “[i]t is no answer, of course, to say that Congress surrendered
its authority by its own hand . . . . Abdication of responsibility is not part of the
constitutional design.”280
Broad notions of acquiescence are problematic for a second reason, grounded in the
general inability of one Congress to bind its successors.281 As Justice Souter explained in
United States v. Winstar,282 that principle derives from English political theory and practice
but survives, in a more limited fashion, in America.283 Hence Chief Justice Marshall’s
opinion in Fletcher v. Peck284 accepted the general principle “that one legislature is
competent to repeal any act which a former legislature was competent to pass; and that one
legislature cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature.”285 The notion that any
given Congress may, through a course of action or simply by inaction, permanently cede
power to another branch seems to fly in the face of this venerable principle. As Justice
Kennedy put it in the line-item veto case, “[t]he Constitution is a compact enduring for
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more than our time, and one Congress cannot yield up its own powers, much less those of
other Congresses to follow.”286
Chief Justice Marshall’s discussion in Fletcher recognized that America’s
commitment to notions of higher law unknown in England necessarily imposed two crucial
limits on parliamentary sovereignty. A legislature might create vested rights which a
subsequent legislature must honor, and a legislature’s sovereignty is also limited more
broadly by the requirements of the federal Constitution.287 One might thus argue that
acquiescence is simply a tool for ascertaining the meaning of these constitutional
limitations—not an attempt by current political actors to bind their successors outside the
Constitution. But that argument only works if we treat governmental practices simply as
potentially persuasive evidence of what the Constitution means, without conferring on
those practices any independent power to fix or change that meaning. Acquiescence would
thus merely add to the persuasiveness of a branch’s past interpretation of constitutional
meaning, because an at-least-potentially rivalrous branch has concurred in that
interpretation.288
My sense is that cases like Zivotofsky tend to give past acquiescence more weight
than this, and to that extent they raise considerable theoretical and practical difficulties. To
the extent that post-ratification practice influences a court to choose a less plausible
interpretation of a provision’s original meaning, one might object that such reliance
amounts to a constitutional amendment outside Article V. Any use of practice raises
problems of indeterminacy, but entrenching that practice against ordinary legal change
raises the stakes considerably. And much of the writing on acquiescence has documented
the advantage it affords to the more active branch. It is easy for the President to take actions
establishing a particular practice, but because Congress generally cannot act without
passing a law, it is difficult for it to affirmatively oppose presidential actions asserting
executive prerogatives.289
Conversely, political actors may be reluctant not to assert their prerogatives in
particular instances for fear of establishing an adverse precedent. In 2002, for example,
Vice President Richard Cheney invoked executive privilege and refused disclose details of
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meetings that he held with officials from the troubled Enron Corporation.290 It is far from
clear that anything scandalous transpired, but Cheney would have had significant
incentives to invoke the privilege regardless, lest he set an adverse precedent that such
meetings are not covered. These sorts of incentives exacerbate the difficulty of political
compromise—a commodity that is already in short supply.
The federal courts cases suggest a different ground for reliance on past practice.
For the most part, federal courts cases seem to rely on past practice simply because it is
past. Federal courts doctrine incorporates the common law and equity practice because it
has been around for a long time and is already integrated into innumerable aspects of our
law. The canons of statutory construction persist because they themselves represent a
longstanding part of the process of construction and, equally important, they integrate new
law with old law. And, as I have already discussed, the most persuasive judicial precedents
are those that have been repeatedly reaffirmed and applied over long periods of time.
Past practice thus enjoys prescriptive authority in this field.291 One might argue for
this authority on any number of grounds. Burke argued that repeated and longstanding
practices embodied a higher form of rationality, based on the concurrence of many minds
over generations rather than the limited reason of present-day lawmakers.292 As David
Strauss has written,
The central traditionalist idea is that one should be very careful about
rejecting judgments made by people who were acting reflectively and in
good faith, especially when those judgments have been reaffirmed or at least
accepted over time. Judgments of this kind embody not just serious thought
by one group of people, or even one generation, but the accumulated
wisdom of many generations. They also reflect a kind of rough empiricism:
they do not rest just on theoretical premises; rather, they have been tested
over time, in a variety of circumstances, and have been found to be at least
good enough.293
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Others stress the disruptive effect of uprooting longstanding practices on settled
expectations, as well as the difficulties of foreseeing all the potential consequences of such
changes.294 Anthony Kronman has even argued that continuity with the social norms and
projects of past generations is what distinguishes humans from animals.295 And still others
have emphasized the sheer difficulty of undertaking anything new if one must constantly
reinvent the wheel by reevaluating established ways of doing things.296
I have little to add to these justifications here. My primary interest is in the frequent
critiques of giving legal force to the past. I turn to those criticisms in the next section.
C.

Nonentrenchment and the Critique of Prescription

Reliance on historical practice in constitutional law has been criticized from a
number of different perspectives. Frequent critiques include the notions that employing
past usage in constitutional interpretation results in a form of “constitutional adverse
possession,” that respect for settled authority represents too great a concession to the “dead
hand of the past,” and that—somewhat inconsistently with the first two critiques—allowing
judges to invoke non-constitutional practices licenses judicial activism by conferring too
much flexibility on judges. These are all criticisms worth taking seriously, and any court
relying on historical practice would do well to keep them firmly in mind. The critical point,
however, is that each of these critiques applies most strongly when past practice is elevated
to the status of a constitutionally entrenched norm.
Take the “adverse possession” critique first. In Noel Canning, for example,
Justice Scalia’s concurrence objected to the majority’s reliance on past practice to expand
the scope of the President’s power to make recess appointments. “The majority justifies
those atextual results on an adverse-possession theory of executive authority,” he
complained, because “Presidents have long claimed the powers in question, and the Senate
has not disputed those claims with sufficient vigor.”297 Rather than defend an adverse
possession approach in principle, the majority unsurprisingly denied that this was what it
was up to. And as my colleagues Curt Bradley and Neil Siegel have shown, there are
important differences between the historical gloss approach approved in Noel Canning and
the rule of adverse possession in property law.298 Most important, “[r]elying on historical
practice to help resolve uncertainties about such allocations [of constitutional power] is
different from allowing it to alter a clearly established allocation.”299 But it is not that
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different. Just as canons of statutory construction play a significant role only when they
cause a court to adopt a statutory reading contrary to what they would have adopted if they
had applied only the other traditional sources of statutory meaning,300 so too historical
practice is most significant when it tips the balance in favor of one constitutional
interpretation rather than another.301 In such cases, practice changes constitutional meaning
from what it would otherwise be—at least to some extent.
Ambiguities plague the constitutional text, and courts often have to resolve them
somehow. Hence, the more appropriate question may not be whether it is legitimate for
historical usage to shape constitutional meaning but rather how past practice compares to
other sources of constitutional meaning. But even from this perspective, there is something
unattractive about the incentives that relying on practice gives to the various institutions of
government to aggressively stake out their positions and maximize their own prerogatives.
It is rather like allowing the foxes to design the security system for the henhouse. In this
sense—the incentives that it gives to bad behavior—reliance on practice can resemble
adverse possession.
This objection is far more troubling, however, when the rights and prerogatives
secured in this manner are perpetual—that is, when reliance on past practice entrenches
that practice against alteration by ordinary legal means. Hence, it is important to Professor
Bradley’s and Siegel’s qualified defense of practice in Noel Canning that it rarely confers
rights of the President that Congress cannot regulate.302 They note that “in foreign affairs
setting such as war powers, executive agreements, the termination of treaties, and the like,
substantial historical practice supports unilateral presidential authority, but little practice
establishes that Congress is disabled from restricting or regulating that authority.”303 The
Court’s subsequent decision in Zivotofsky, of course, casts some doubt on this conclusion.
But the federal courts doctrines I have surveyed here do have that character—that is, they
employ past practice to supplement the constitutional text and set default rules, but they do
not purport to elevate that practice to entrenched constitutional status. To my mind, this
strikes the right balance between the need for some source of law to answer questions
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unresolved in the constitutional text and the imperative to prevent (or at least mitigate)
institutional self-aggrandizement.
A second objection to prescription is—not surprisingly—that it is too conservative.
One need not be a Jeffersonian intent on holding a revolution every generation to be
troubled by the prospect of locking in past practice.304 For example, Justice Scalia
suggested in Burnham v. Superior Court305 that procedural practices, such as “tag”
jurisdiction, that have endured throughout our history are always consistent with “due
process.” “The short of the matter,” Scalia said, “is that jurisdiction based on physical
presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our
legal system that define the due process standard of ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’”306 This drew a strong academic dissent from David Strauss, who
argued that traditionalism “is not remotely an acceptable approach” because it would lock
us in to any number of deplorable practices.307
I have assessed general arguments against traditionalism elsewhere;308 for present
purposes, two points are critical. First, as with “adverse possession,” concerns about the
dead hand of past practice stifling innovation and change become radically less compelling
when past practice is not constitutionally entrenched. The primary role of historical practice
in federal courts law is to fill gaps—to supply procedures, remedies, or defenses that are
necessary to constitute a functioning judicial system but unspecified in the constitutional
text or the various judiciary acts. Far from embodying a “dead hand,” this sort of
supplementation enables the legal system to live and function effectively.309 And with only
rare exceptions—e.g., state sovereign immunity—these gap-fillers are not themselves
entrenched against change through ordinary legislation. Moreover, the courts themselves
have modified past practices in light of contemporary necessities.310
Second, the past practices upon which federal courts doctrine relies are frequently
themselves highly dynamic bodies of law. As Justice Scalia has noted, “[t]here is nothing
See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1163 (9th Cir. 2001) (Kozinski, J.) (“One danger of giving
constitutional status to practices that existed at common law, but have changed over time, is that it tends to
freeze certain aspects of the law into place, even as other aspects change significantly.”).
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new or surprising in the proposition that our unchanging Constitution refers to other bodies
of law that might themselves change.”311 Incorporating the common law or equity practice
into various aspects of federal courts law not only facilitates the ability of that law to fulfill
its (frequently progressive) purposes,312 but also incorporates a tradition of judicial
innovation in response to changing institutional needs. Even if, for example, the canons of
construction may blunt some of the impact of reformist legislation, the imperative to
integrate reform with existing legal structures and norms may ultimately make reform more
palatable by reducing its associated risk of disruption. And the common law vision of
constitutional law defined primarily by judicial precedent has frequently helped
constitutional law address changing social practices and conditions.313
Five years after slamming Justice Scalia’s traditionalism as “just not an acceptable
creed,”
Professor Strauss wrote an important article advocating “Common Law
Constitutional Interpretation.”315 That article rejected claims that the common law is too
conservative, noting that “at various periods in its history the common law has shown a
great capacity for innovation.”316 My point is not to accuse one of our most thoughtful legal
scholars of inconsistency; rather, he was—in a sense—right both times.317 Both the
conservatism that Strauss criticized and the organic reformism that he praised are essential
elements of Burke’s theory of prescription. If reliance on past practice rests on norms of
prescription, then that may encourage courts to implement that reliance in the organic,
incremental, and disciplined fashion that prescription celebrates.
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the stock criticism of legislative history, which is that it is like “looking over a crowd and
picking out your friends.”319 Hence, Judge Kozinski has argued that constitutionalizing
past practices “will allow judges to pick and choose those ancient practices they find
salutary as a matter of policy, and give them constitutional status.”320 On the other hand,
the authority of established norms and practices is likely to rule out certain forms of
activism, such as a reading of the Vesting Clause of Article I that invalidates the
administrative state or a reading of the Fourteenth Amendment that enforces Rawlsian
egalitarianism.
Reliance on practice is like any other modality of constitutional interpretation, in
that it can get out of hand if not disciplined by the conventions of legal argument and the
norms of the judicial craft.321 It is unclear that any theory of the sources of constitutional
interpretation can truly constrain courts.322 What we can do is insist that most instances of
judicial creativity remain subject to democratic checks. It is worth noting that Burke’s
notion of prescription comes from a legal system built on a baseline of parliamentary
sovereignty. Both the authority of tradition and the common law’s potential for organic
growth and judicial creativity are tempered, in British law, by the democratic authority of
Parliament to overrule traditions that are no longer useful or innovations that press too far.
This comparative law point simply underscores the argument with which I began this
Part—that is, that in most cases, historical practices should not be constitutionally
entrenched unless they stem clearly and directly from the text of the Constitution. As long
as that is true, excesses of both conservatism and activism will be subject to correction by
later legislatures and courts.
Conclusion
Burkean invocations of prescription have always rung a bit strange in America.323
Our Constitution is not, like Burke’s, “a prescriptive constitution . . . whose sole authority
is that it has existed time out of mind.”324 Americans have, rather, a constitutive document
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whose authority can be grounded in specific democratic exertions, with a canonical text
that can be parsed and debated, and identifiable Framers whose intents and understandings
can be plumbed. We have this arrangement, moreover, as the result of a revolution that
was, at least in part, a rather emphatic rejection of the prescriptive force of longstanding
British institutions.325
Nonetheless, just as the new American nation adopted the English common law as
a familiar, off-the-shelf set of default principles for the resolution of disputes after the
Revolution, we have also adopted a broad tendency to rely on past practices to resolve
present legal quandaries. This tendency is nowhere more evident than in the law of federal
courts, which at every turn relies on extensive bodies of doctrinal precedents, incorporates
preexisting bodies of law, and employs canons of statutory construction to harmonize new
enactments with past practice. Although constitutional theory is beginning to wake up to
the significance of historical practice as a distinctive modality of constitutional
interpretation, theorists will do well not to overlook this body of law in favor of more highprofile inter-branch disputes over the separation of powers. Because federal courts law
grounds its reliance on past usage in prescriptive authority and generally does not entrench
practice against change through ordinary legislation, it provides a healthier model for how
practice should figure across the board.
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